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REVISITING CONGRESS' NEW IDEA IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 
Dixie Snow Huefner· 
I write in response to Christopher Dean Greenwood's 
article, "Congress' New IDEA in Special Education," appearing 
in the inaugural issue of BYU's Journal of Law and 
Education. 1 Although the author raises a legitimate question 
as to whether some of the costs associated with Part B of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA-B) are 
unduly burdensome to the public education system, the article 
itself does not illuminate the answer. Because the author 
misreports and apparently misunderstands some of the 
statutory requirements, his thesis is undermined. 
My intent in this comment is to place Part B of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in a broader 
context than does Greenwood and to illuminate why his 
arguments are inadequate. I begin with a description setting 
forth the basic components of the statute-by way of expansion 
and clarification of Greenwood's brief overview. I then address 
the major problems with his article, as I see them. 
l. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
Originally enacted in 1975 as Public Law 94-142 (the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act),2 IDEA-B 
requires states accepting federal funds under the statute to 
assure that a "free appropriate public education" is available to 
eligible students with disabilities.3 As Greenwood notes, at the 
time of its passage many states continued to engage in a long-
standing pattern of excluding students with disabilities, 
particularly intellectual and emotional disabilities, from the 
public school system. This discriminatory exclusion was in spite 
of the fact that these children were educable and in need of 
M.S., J.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Special Education, University 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
1. B.Y.U. L. and Educ. J., Spring 1992, 49-73 (formerly B.Y.U. J.L. and 
Educ.). 
2. P.L. 94-142 was Part B of the more-encompassing Education of the 
Handicapped Act (EHA). The 1990 Amendments to EHA renamed the entire 
statute the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. It is Part B that was the 
subject of Greenwood's article and is the subject of this Comment. 
3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B). 
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education services.4 The statute is a remedial statute, intended 
to bring unserved or underserved students fully into the 
education system and to help states pay for the added costs of 
educating them.5 It is a money grant to states conditioned on 
state acceptance of federal standards. In case the reader was 
confused, Greenwood's various references to the Education of 
the Handicapped Act, the Education for all Handicapped 
Children Act, and the IDEA are to the same basic special 
education statute, as amended over time. The regulations 
implementing the statute flesh out the standards for receipt of 
the federal money and are mandates, not "guidelines" as 
Greenwood frequently refers to them. 
IDEA-B requires school districts to locate and identify 
all children within their jurisdiction who may be eligible for 
special education.6 The federal regulations require that, prior 
to receipt of special education services, a student must receive 
a multidisciplinary evaluation for eligibility. 7 Eligible students 
must receive specially designed instruction directed by an 
individualized education program (IEP) that is meant to be 
developed and written jointly by school professionals and the 
parents.8 The instruction and related services needed for these 
students to benefit from special education must be delivered "to 
the maximum extent appropriate" in settings with students 
who are not disabled. 9 Where appropriate education cannot be 
accomplished in a "mainstream" (regular school or regular 
class) setting, it may be provided in a segregated setting. 10 
4. For background information about the educability of the children with 
disabilities who were being excluded from the public schools, see the landmark 
cases of Mills v. Board of Educ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 349 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 
1972) and PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(c). 
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C). 
7. 34 C.F.R. §300.532. 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(20); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 and Appendix C. 
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). 
10. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-552. 
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To protect students with disabilities11 from arbitrary and 
ill-conceived school decision-making, parents are given a 
number of procedural rights to exercise on behalf of their 
children. Among them are the right to notification, written 
consent prior to initial evaluation and initial placement, access 
to their child's educational records, an independent educational 
evaluation under certain circumstances, participation in the 
development of the IEP, and the right to a hearing to contest 
proposed school actions with respect to identification, 
evaluation, placement, and delivery of a free appropriate public 
education. 12 Only when these procedural rights have failed to 
protect a child's educational rights will the due process hearing 
of which Greenwood speaks come into play. 
II. GREENWOOD'S ARGUMENTS 
Greenwood's major thesis seems to be that 1986 and 1990 
amendments to IDEA-B, or judicial interpretation of them, 
have unduly burdened the public school system by: ( 1) 
increasing the numbers of students served and the difficulty of 
identifying them, (2) allowing injudicious awards of attorneys' 
fees to parents, (3) allowing awards of "monetary damages" 
against school districts failing to provide students with the 
mandated free appropriate public education, and (4) removing 
state immunity from suit. A secondary thesis appears to be 
that federal special education regulations are vague and 
difficult for educators to comprehend, thereby creating 
difficulty implementing them. 
Greenwood's thesis that IDEA-B may create undue 
financial burden on schools is not the subject of my criticism; 
rather, it is the logic and documentation upon which his thesis 
depends. I will address each of the above points and indicate 
why, in my view, they are inadequately supported. 
11. The 1990 Amendments made an important shift in terminology, deleting all 
statutory references to "handicap" and substituting the term "disability." Advocates 
for students with disabilities had argued that the term disability was less 
stigmatizing than handicap. Moreover they successfully argued that the adjective 
form of the term disability (i.e., disabled) should not be used to characterize special 
education students. Therefore, the statute refers to "children with disabilities," not 
to disabled children, reflecting the view that persons with disabilities are ordinary 
persons first, whose disability is secondary to their personhood. The field of special 
education has adopted the statutory terminology. 
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1415; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-514. 
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A. Burdens on Teachers 
Greenwood mistakenly asserts that in 1990 IDEA-B 
broadened "the scope of disabilities to include, among others, 
children with serious emotional disturbance, traumatic brain 
injury, and specific learning disabilities" (p. 59). Greenwood 
apparently is unaware that from its inception in 1975, IDEA-B 
included as eligible disabilities both specific learning 
disabilities and serious emotional disturbances-the first and 
fourth largest categories of eligible students. 13 And the 1990 
addition of traumatic brain injury as a discrete disability 
category is not likely to increase teachers' workloads 
substantially. Instead it brings political visibility to brain 
injured students with learning problems who had previously 
been eligible for services under the label of "Specific Learning 
Disability."14 
Additionally, Greenwood imprecisely concludes that 
"elusive conditions such as attention deficit disorder, 
hyperactivity, and impulsivity" are also newly covered 
disabilities under the category of "Other Health Impaired" (p. 
59). This statement reveals a misunderstanding of the debate 
over whether to extend coverage to students with Attention 
Deficit Disorder and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADD/ADHD). First of all, hyperactivity and impulsivity are 
not conditions that alone make one eligible as a student with a 
health impairment. Instead they are merely components of 
13. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) § 4(a) added specific learning 
disabilities to Section 602 of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) (defining 
children with disabilities). Serious emotional disturbance had been included in the 
original EHA, Pub. L. No. 91-230, Sec. 602, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). The Twelfth 
Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the EHA (1990, p. A-50) 
estimated that !i percent of school-age students were served as learning disabled 
during the 1988-89 school year, and 1 percent of students as seriously emotionally 
disturbed. 
14. 34 C.F.R. §300.5(9) (1984). Greenwood did not address the problem of 
identifying and serving students with traumatic brain injuries. Although these 
children could be served in the past as learning disabled, advocates asserted that 
the numbers of students with TBI had increased to the point that their erratic, 
puzzling, and unpredictable neurological behaviors demanded recognition as a 
separate category. To the extent that schools can less easily ignore the very real 
and unusual needs of children with TBI, they may identify more of them than 
before. Whether, or by how much, the numbers will escalate remains to be seen. 
Autism was the other disability given separate status in the 1990 Amendments. 
The workload implications are negligible because students with autism had been 
served for years under the category of "Other Health Impaired." See 34 C.F.R. § 
330.5(7) (1984). 
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ADHD, as is distractibility.15 Second, ADD/ADHD was 
specifically excluded as a new disability category in the 1990 
Amendments. In a memo explaining the denial of coverage, 
federal officials noted that students with ADD/ADHD could be 
eligible for IDEA-B coverage if, in addition to ADD, they had a 
covered disability such as a learning disability, or a health 
impairment that produced a severe enough reduction in 
alertness so as to require special education services. 16 Such a 
determination would have to be made on a case by case basis. 
Although it is possible that IDEA-B coverage may be extended 
to some previously excluded ADD/ADHD students as a result of 
the federal memo, it is more likely that regular education 
classrooms will be expected to make the necessary 
modifications to meet the educational needs of these students. 
In any event, the cap of 12% on the number of students toward 
whose excess costs the federal government will contribute has 
remained the same since 1975.17 
Greenwood notes the serious shortage of special education 
teachers in this country and the stretched public school 
budgets. These are realities that have plagued special 
education for years. The refusal to create a new category of 
ADD/ADHD students to be served under IDEA-B was, in part, 
a response to this reality. The problem is serious but more a 
reflection of the failure to allocate resources to education than 
of recent federal expansion of eligibility categories. Greenwood's 
argument that the 1990 Amendments increased the number of 
disabled children, thereby increasing teacher workloads and 
"aggravating deficiencies" (p. 59) is a flawed one. 
Greenwood accurately notes the technical nature of 
government regulations. The suggestion, however, that the 
federal regulations implementing IDEA-B are inaccessible and 
largely incomprehensible to teachers and administrators (p. 60) 
is an overstatement. The federal regulations have been in place 
since 1977, with occasional revisions since. Each state's special 
education rules must parallel and reflect the federal 
regulations, and special education administrators are required 
to be thoroughly grounded in the state rules. Furthermore, 
15. See, e.g., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R), 
1987. Basically, ADD simply refers to the presence of various symptoms of 
distractibility (inattentiveness) and impulsivity without hyperactivity. ADHD adds 
the hyperactivity symptoms. 
16. 18 IDELR 116 (OSERS, OSEP, OCR 1991). 
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(5)(A). 
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every special education teacher should either possess or have 
ready access to a personal copy of the state rules, even if they 
do not have a personal copy of the federal regulations. Access 
should not be an issue. As for their "legalese" (p. 60) (a problem 
common to all federal regulations), the reformatting of the 
regulations in the state rules does much to facilitate their 
readability. In my experience, to the extent that special 
educators do not understand their basic legal obligations under 
state and federal law, it is usually a failure of pre-service and 
in-service training rather than the "legalese" of the rules. 
To illustrate his belief that the regulations are difficult to 
interpret, Greenwood quotes the definition of serious emotional 
disturbance (SED), and then inexplicably equates ADD with 
SED (p. 61). The two are not and have never been synonymous. 
Attention deficit disorder, as already mentioned, has its own 
set of characteristics and is not even a special education 
disability, while serious emotional disturbance is a long 
standing one. Greenwood accurately notes the difficulty 
distinguishing social maladjustment from some of the 
characteristics of what he calls ADD but what is in actuality 
serious emotional disturbance. He complains that the "average 
teacher cannot reasonably be expected to discriminate among 
her students so as to make any sure determination of disability 
without the aid of a trained professional" (p. 61). This latter 
statement is correct, but it is not clear why he complains about 
it. It would be inappropriate and improper for a regular 
educator to decide alone that a student has a disability. The 
implications of disability status are serious for the student, 
involving potential stigma and treatment that in many 
instances isolates the student from peers. Classification as 
disabled should be made ONLY with the aid of trained 
personnel. And although at times it is difficult for trained 
personnel to be certain whether a student is socially 
maladjusted rather than seriously emotionally disturbed, 
Greenwood's conclusion that professional determinations may 
be "ad hoc, given the over-inclusive and vague definitions [of 
serious emotional disturbance]" (p. 62) is speculative. Given the 
exclusion of ADD and social maladjustment from the definition, 
it is unclear why the definition is over-inclusive. Furthermore, 
his conclusion ignores the extensive requirements for 
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multidisciplinary, nondiscriminatory, multi-faceted eligibility 
procedures. 18 
When Greenwood discusses the IEP, he again 
demonstrates his lack of understanding of IDEA-B. His most 
serious error is to state that "all discussions and suggestions 
among professional educators and administrators regarding the 
child, along with parent-teacher conferences or other formal 
and informal proceedings, must be recorded in the IEP'' (p. 62). 
The implication is that the IEP is an unwieldy and bulky 
record of numerous meetings. Instead, it is a short document 
developed at an IEP meeting. It includes the student's current 
levels of performance, annual goals and objectives, amount of 
regular and special education and related support services, and 
criteria for measuring progress toward the attainment of the 
specified objectives. In Utah, for instance, most IEPs are one to 
two pages in length. Although proper development of an IEP 
can take time, the process at its best brings the key players 
(parents, teachers, support personnel, sometimes the student) 
together to design a program that meets the unique needs of a 
given student. 
Although the high expectations of IDEA-B, coupled with 
relatively modest federal financial support for state and local 
funding efforts, make it vulnerable to legitimate criticism, 
Greenwood's criticisms are not well bolstered. His inaccuracies 
do not help him make his case that the burdens on teachers 
are increasing. 
B. Administrative Hearing Costs 
When a conflict arises between the home and the school 
over the identification, evaluation, placement, or provision of a 
free appropriate public education, either the school or the 
parent may seek resolution of the conflict at an impartial, 
administrative hearing. 19 Greenwood does not inform the 
reader that the hearing mechanism was inserted in the statute 
to avoid the need for long, drawn-out litigation. Congress hoped 
that it would save money and emotional trauma for all 
concerned. Nonetheless, Greenwood is quite correct in pointing 
out that most of the costs of these hearings must be paid for by 
education agencies. In fact, their usefulness has not met 
18. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530-542. 
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) & (b)(2); 34 C.F.R. §300.506. 
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original expectations, and their costs-in time, money, and 
emotional strain-have proved to be a significant burden to 
both parties to the dispute.20 
C. Remedies for Noncompliance with IDEA-B 
Greenwood is careless in referring to the remedies for 
noncompliance with IDEA-B as "damage" remedies (pages 50, 
66, 71, 72, 73), while elsewhere (p. 64) referring to the 
remedies as "the practical equivalent" of damages. As of yet, no 
compensatory damages for pain and suffering have been 
awarded under the statute. As Greenwood observes, where an 
education agency has failed to provide a free appropriate public 
education, the courts have awarded two types of relief that 
bring increased financial burdens for the education agency: (1) 
tuition reimbursement for parents who have withdrawn their 
children from inappropriate programs and placed them 
properly in private school, and (2) compensatory education 
(usually education extending past the mandatory school age) 
for children whose parents did not withdraw them from public 
school but who were denied appropriate education for 
significant periods of time. Although these remedies do indeed 
result in financial cost to the districts, the courts typically are 
careful to distinguish them from "damage awards" and to 
characterize them instead as a means of requiring an education 
agency to provide the instruction it should have been providing 
all along. In fact, the courts make a point of stating that they 
are not awarding "damages" for the school's omissions.21 
Earlier in the article Greenwood describes as remedies 
"injunctions such as a stay of educational placement during 
administrative proceedings, or a reimbursement of private 
tuition while the proceedings are pending'' (p. 58). Both 
examples mislead the reader. First, although injunctions 
20. See, e.g., Steven S. Goldberg, The Failure of Legalization in Education: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Education for all Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975, 18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION 441 (1989). 
21. See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 
359, 370-71 (1985) (tuition reimbursement is not "damages" but "merely requires 
the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would 
have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP"). See also 
Waterman v. Marquette-Alger lntermed. School Dist., 739 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Mich. 
1990) (monetary damages not recoverable under EHA); Puffer v. Raynolds, 761 F. 
Supp. 838, 853 (D.Mass. 1988) (request for monetary damages denied; remedial 
education instead will correct any damage done). 
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against the school district are indeed a common form of relief, a 
"stay of educational placement" is not an injunction. What 
Greenwood is referring to is the fact that IDEA-B includes a so-
called "stay-put provision," requiring a child to remain in the 
current educational placement pending the outcome of 
administrative proceedings.22 An injunction is not necessary to 
invoke the stay-put provision. In fact, the opposite is true; the 
stay-put provision applies UNLESS a school district can get an 
injunction to remove a student from the current placement 
without the need for parental permission or an administrative 
hearing decision. 23 Second, reimbursement is not available 
while proceedings are pending. Greenwood is alluding to the 
fact that, although the stay-put provision applies to school 
districts, it does not prevent parents from placing their child 
unilaterally in a private placement pending the outcome of the 
proceedings. The parents, however, do not have a right to 
reimbursement "while the proceedings are pending"; rather 
parents may be reimbursed only if the OUTCOME of the 
proceedings is a determination that the education agency was 
denying the student a free, appropriate public education and 
the parental placement was proper.24 
D. Attorneys' Fee Awards 
Greenwood is not alone in his concern about the 1986 
Amendment to IDEA-B making reasonable attorneys' fees 
available to parents who prevail in administrative hearings or 
in court; other critics have questioned the wisdom of allowing 
prevailing parents to be reimbursed by school districts for their 
attorneys' fees. His language is inflammatory, however, 
because he concludes-without adequate documentation-that 
courts can make an education agency pay for trivial, "de 
minimis" results favoring the parent and for an "inadvertent 
procedural flaw or delay" (p. 67). The U.S. Supreme Court 
standard for determining that a party has prevailed is that a 
significant or material change in the party's legal status is a 
result of the proceeding,25 not exactly a "de minimis" result. 
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3). 
23. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
24. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 
(1985). 
25. See, e.g., Te.xas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland lndep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 
782, 793 (1989). See also, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) ("where 
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And after more than fifteen years' experience with the statute, 
education agencies are not in a good position to reasonably 
argue that their procedural flaws or delays are inadvertent.26 
E. Abrogation of State Immunity 
Of special concern to Greenwood is the fact that the 1990 
Amendments clarified that IDEA abrogates state immunity 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. He asserts, 
imprecisely, that "the Eleventh Amendment has long prevented 
suits against states for money damages where such awards 
were to be paid from public funds in the treasury" (p. 68). In 
actuality, the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits IN FEDERAL 
COURT against states but has never prevented such suits in 
state court. 27 Perhaps his misstatement is simply careless, 
because in other parts of his article, he appears to acknowledge 
the correct standard; in any event, his imprecision creates a 
problem for the reader. 
Similarly, Greenwood errs in stating that Dellmuth v. 
Muth evidences that the Supreme Court "did not believe 
Congress intended to grant an enforceable right to education to 
children with handicaps ... " (p. 69). It is absolutely clear 
under the initial version of IDEA-B in 1975 and all its 
amended versions that Congress granted an enforceable private 
right of action to children with disabilities.28 For fifteen years, 
aggrieved students have been suing education agencies in both 
state and federal court for violation of the statute. What was 
the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only 
that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained"). 
26. Moreover, courts in general distinguish between harmless procedural errors 
that do not deprive students of significant rights (e.g. oral notice of desired 
changes in IEP instead of written notice), and serious procedural errors (failure to 
notify parents of their legal rights, failure to involve them in the development of 
the IEP) that have the effect of denying their child the right to a free appropriate 
public education. Only the latter will affect the outcome of the case and the 
determination of whether the parent was a prevailing party. 
27. The text of the Eleventh Amendment states: "The judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another 
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." For over a hundred years, 
the Amendment has been construed judicially to also preclude suit in federal court 
against a state by citizens of that same state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890). 
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) has continuously provided that "any party aggrieved 
by the findings and decision [of the final administrative hearing] shall have the 
right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented .... " 
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not clear at first was whether the remedies extended to 
financial awards (in contrast to injunctions and declaratory 
relief). The answer with respect to local education agencies was 
settled in the affirmative by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Burlington School Committee u. Massachusetts Department of 
Education. 29 Several years later, the Supreme Court in 
Dellmuth u. Muth30 concluded that, absent an unequivocal 
pronouncement in the text of IDEA that state education 
agencies accepting federal money under IDEA-B waived their 
immunity from suit in federal court, state immunity was not 
waived. The decision had no applicability to local education 
agencies. Fast on the heels of this decision, Congress explicitly 
established its unequivocal intent to waive state immunity.31 
The primary rationale for abrogating immunity is found in 
older IDEA-B language charging the state education agency 
with the responsibility for assuring that other governmental 
agencies meet their obligations under the statute;32 in other 
words, the state education agency is the entity intended to be 
held accountable when a local school district defaults. Another 
situation leading to a need to sue the state is when a state-
operated program, such as a state school for the deaf, itself is 
allegedly denying appropriate special education services to a 
student. The number of local and intermediate education 
agencies defaulting on their financial obligations under IDEA-B 
has not been high to date, and suits for financial awards 
against ANY education agency, whether state or local, constitute 
a minority of suits against education agencies under IDEA-
B.aa 
Finally, Greenwood asserts that abrogation of state 
immunity may have the effect of making each state's immunity 
statute "determinative of a state agency's liability under the 
29. 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
30. 491 u.s. 223 (1989). 
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a)-(b). 
32. 20 U.S.C. §1412(6); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). 
33. Suits for or against various changes in evaluation, placement, and 
programming constitute a larger group of cases. Of course, decisions in these kinds 
of disputes also can have significant financial implications, e.g., the cost of 
expensive related services needed to enable a student to benefit from special 
education. The most expensive related service is the cost of the non-medical care 
(including board and room) in a residential facility, in the rare situation when a 
student needs such a facility to receive a free appropriate public education. See 
Dixie S. Huefner, Special Education Residential Placements under the Education {or 
All Handicapped Children Act, 18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION 411 
(1989). 
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IDEA" (p. 70). This is an erroneous conclusion and one that 
contradicts his own recognition on the previous page that 
federal law is supreme over conflicting state law. The 1990 
IDEA-B amendment abrogating state immunity from suit in 
federal court also states (and Greenwood quotes it on p. 69) 
that remedies against a state are available "to the same extent 
as such remedies are available . . . against any public entity 
other than a State."34 In effect, this provision abrogates state 
sovereign immunity statutes, making them irrelevant in either 
federal or state court, since state courts must enforce the 
provisions of overriding federal law. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The dominant question Greenwood intended to raise 
appears to be whether the costs of tuition reimbursement, 
compensatory education, administrative hearings, and 
attorneys' fees are so disproportionate to the benefits achieved 
as to deserve a radical rethinking. Although many school 
districts insure themselves against the costs of the parents' 
attorney's fees, hearing costs and financial awards typically 
must be paid for out of special education budgets and in a 
sense are "robbing from Peter to pay Paul." Greenwood's 
question is a legitimate one. Without a great deal of empirical 
data, however, we are not in a position to ascertain whether 
the hearing costs and the investment in the small numbers of 
students receiving compensatory education and tuition 
reimbursements are helping or harming special education (and, 
by extension, regular education) in the long run. Among 
questions that deserve to be investigated but are not addressed 
in Greenwood's article are the following: 
1. How many awards of compensatory education and 
tuition reimbursement have been made since 1978 (when 
IDEA-B standards became enforceable in court) against local 
school districts? Against state education agencies? What 
percent of the special education population does this represent? 
2. What has been the actual financial cost to education 
agencies of these awards? What services to other special 
education students have been cut as a result of these costs? 
3. Is there evidence that awards of compensatory education 
and tuition reimbursement have declined with time in the 
34. 20 u.s.c. §1403(b). 
-
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affected school districts? In other words, is there evidence that 
these remedies may be having the beneficial effect of reducing 
the extent of a school district's noncompliance with IDEA-B? 
4. What is the cost to education agencies of awarding 
attorneys' fees? Will insurance companies continue to protect 
education agencies against this kind of liability? 
5. What percent of the special education population seeks 
an administrative hearing in any given year? Does the hearing 
save money in the long run if it assures that special education 
students receive an appropriate education that will increase 
their self-sufficiency and independence after they leave school? 
In other words, is it a cost-effective investment for society? 
6. Would a cap on the amount of reimbursement that 
education agencies could pay for court-approved private 
placements better balance the needs of all special education 
students? 
7. Are there data suggesting that regular education is 
being harmed by the relief being awarded by courts to ensure 
that education agencies comply with IDEA-B? 
Greenwood reveals his conclusion in his introduction when 
he states that federal legislation "directs exceptional attention 
to a single class of children at the expense of the majority" (p. 
50). He reiterates that viewpoint in his final sentence. Neither 
his scholarship, his understanding of school finance, nor his 
representation of the federal special education statute creates 
confidence in his conclusion. Although there is genuine reason 
for concern about the financial costs of noncompliance with 
IDEA-B, the Greenwood article does not contribute to our 
understanding of whether the costs are excessive or of who may 
be more hurt by these costs-special education students or 
regular education students. 
~---------
